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 Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret Anscombe single-handedly inaugurated the contemporary 
study of moral psychology with her magisterial Intention of 1957 and Modern Moral Philosophy 
of 1958 (MMP).2 While doing so she focused attention on double-effect reasoning (DER) and its 
Intended/Foreseen (or, I/F) distinction, the exclusive purview up to that point of Catholic moral 
theologians.3 Here she is in MMP: 
[t]he denial of any distinction between foreseen and 
intended consequences, as far as responsibility is 
concerned, was not made by Sidgwick in developing any 
one ‘method of ethics’; he made this important move on 
behalf of everybody and just on its own account; and I 
think it plausible to suggest that this move on the part of 
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Sidgwick explains the difference between old-fashioned 
utilitarianism and that consequentialism, as I name it, 
which marks him and every English academic philosopher 
since him. By it, the kind of consideration which formerly 
would have been regarded as a temptation, the kind of 
considerations urged upon men by wives and flattering 
friends, was given a status by moral philosophers in their 
theories.4 
In MMP, Anscombe holds that absent acknowledgment of the I/F distinction’s ethical relevance, 
one ineluctably descends into that brand of ethics whose now-standard name she coins in the 
above passage, Consequentialism. She goes on to say, “[i]t is a necessary feature of 
consequentialism that it is a shallow philosophy.” (I will later argue that consequentialism is 
shallow, indeed. For, due in part to its denial of the I/F distinction, its act-evaluations remain 
entirely on the surface of ethics.) 
 Subsequently, Anscombe defends disputed aspects of double effect.5 While solely 
responsible for the attention given to DER outside of Catholic circles, Anscombe herself 
proposes in its stead (or, perhaps more accurately, instead of the prominent corruptions of double 
effect familiar to her) what she refers to as the, “principle of side effects.” In what follows, I will 
present: first, the salient abuses of double effect that incline Anscombe to offer her, “principle of 
side effects”; second, her principle; third, a sound account of double effect (taking Aquinas’ 
original treatment as a model); fourth and finally, a response to the concern that leads Anscombe 
to employ her principle in lieu of double effect. 
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I. Corruptions of Double Effect: Cartesianism and Proportionalism. 
a. Cartesianism. 
 In her advocacy of double effect, Anscombe herself always retains a healthy skepticism 
concerning accounts of double effect. Indeed, she regards it as a source of corrupt moral 
thinking: 
[n]ow, to make an epigram, the corruption of non-Catholic 
moral thought has consisted in the denial of this doctrine, 
and the corruption of Catholic thought in the abuse of it.6 
[and,] 
we are touching on the principle of “double effect”. The 
denial of this has been the corruption of non-Catholic 
thought, and its abuse the corruption of Catholic thought.7 
As evident in the earlier quote from MMP, Anscombe regards the denial of the I/F distinction as 
at the heart of Consequentialism. Hence, she links the denial of double effect to this specific 
decline in moral thought. As for the abuse of double effect, she has at least two culprits in mind, 
an old one (Cartesianism) and a new one (Proportionalism, the dominant account of Catholic 
moral theology regnant from the late 1960's up to the papal encyclical Veritatis Splendor of 1993 
which condemns the account). Let us consider the older first. 
 In her rediscovery of practical knowledge’s distinctiveness, Anscombe constantly battles 
a Cartesian conception of mind as entirely speculative: 
[c]an it be that there is something that modern philosophy 
has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and 
 4 
medieval philosophers meant by practical knowledge? 
Certainly in modern philosophy we have an incorrigibly 
contemplative conception of knowledge. Knowledge must 
be something that is judged as such by being in accordance 
with the facts. The facts, reality, are prior and dictate what 
is to be said, if it is knowledge. And this is the explanation 
of the utter darkness in which we found ourselves [at the 
outset of the investigation of intention]. For if there are two 
knowledges – one by observation, the other in intention – 
then it looks as if there must be two objects of knowledge; 
but if one says the objects are the same, one looks 
hopelessly for the different mode of contemplative 
knowledge in acting, as if there were a very queer and 
special sort of seeing eye in the middle of acting.8 
The, “very queer and special sort of seeing eye,” is, of course, the subject of Descartes’, “cogito 
ergo sum,” (“I think, therefore, I am”) the, “res cogitans,” (“thing thinking”). This Cartesian 
subjectivism leads to the (erroneous) position that Anscombe (wo)manfully argues against in 
Intention: 
that if we wish to understand what intention is, we must be 
investigating something whose existence is purely in the 
sphere of the mind; and that although intention issues in 
actions, and the way this happens also presents interesting 
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questions, still what physically takes place, i.e., what a man 
actually does, is the very last thing we need consider in our 
enquiry. Whereas I wish to say it is the first.9 
The conception of the acting subject as uniquely authoritative concerning his intent leads to one 
(apparently chronic) abuse of double effect.10 Three centuries before Anscombe, Pascal 
lampoons it as the, “grande méthode de diriger l’intention.”11 Anscombe calls this abuse, 
“absurd,” and, “ludicrous.” One finds her most famous reference to this error in Intention: 
it would appear that we can choose to have a certain 
intention and not another, just by e.g. saying within 
ourselves: ‘What I mean to be doing is earning my living, 
and not poisoning the household’; or ‘what I mean to be 
doing is helping those good men into power; I withdraw my 
intention from the act of poisoning the household, which I 
prefer to think goes on without my intention being in it’. 
The idea that one can determine one’s intentions by making 
such a little speech to oneself is obvious bosh. (original 
emphases)12 
To put paid to the error and to redeem her claim of, “bosh,” Anscombe presents an argument: 
[i]s there ever a place for an interior act of intention? I 
suppose that the man I imagined, who said ‘I was only 
doing my usual job’, might find this formula and administer 
it to himself in the present tense at some stage of his 
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activities. However, if he does this, we notice that the 
question immediately arises: with what intention does he do 
it? This question would always arise about anything which 
was deliberately performed as an ‘act of intending’.13 
An intention concerning one’s intention (a second-order intention – of course, we have such 
intentions, in fact, ethics generally and moral reform specifically would seem to depend upon 
them) does not escape scrutiny; rather, it gives rise to it. That is, why does one employ the grand 
method? “To elude the constraints of morality,” or (less objectionably, but still problematic), “to 
render my otherwise impermissible act permissible,” hardly exemplifies the troubled consciences 
that have legitimate recourse to casuistry. (Now largely a pejorative term, but one that originates 
in the Latin casus conscientiae, or “case of conscience.”)14 
 The Cartesian emphasis upon the special authority of the acting subject (conceived of as 
entirely mental and “inside” – yet utterly distinct from – the body) seems to give rise to the grand 
method.15 Why would this be so? Perhaps the unquestioned or privileged authority of the agent 
leads to the idea that the agent need only express, as it were, an alternative intention and, voilà, 
that would be his intent. This account conceives of intent as if it were simply a sentence, or 
something the agent says to himself as he acts instead of the embodied form practical thinking 
(including intending) takes, namely, doing something, acting. One’s doings are typically 
accurately described by those, as Anscombe says, “grown to the age of reason in the same 
world.”16 
 To sum up, Cartesianism’s direction of intention is a non-starter. For, one naturally asks, 
“with what intent does one direct one’s intent?” Moreover, the underlying view of mind as 
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entirely speculative simply cannot serve as a sound moral psychology. For it fails as a 
psychology (especially of action). Rather, it is a false theory that threatens to undermine our 
(self-) understanding of the very real phenomenon that prompted recourse to it: embodied 
psyche. Let us now turn to Anscombe’s second culprit. 
I.b. Proportionalism. 
 The much more novel (and, correspondingly, both less chronic and much easier to 
counter) corruption of double effect arises out of (ironically) a Consequentialist reading of 
Aquinas’ original account of double effect. Anscombe refers to this as the, “package Doctrine of 
Double Effect.”17 
 In the article inaugurating this most recent abuse of double effect (and corruption of 
Catholic moral theology), the Jesuit theologian Peter Knauer considers St. Thomas’ discussion of 
double effect (S.t., IIaIIae, q. 64, a. 7) as the paradigm of what will come to be called, 
“Proportionalism.” In the relevant passage, Aquinas straightforwardly notes that: 
some act arising from a good intention can be made 
unlawful if it is not proportionate to the end 
(proportionatus fini). And, therefore, if someone defending 
his own life uses more force than necessary, it would be 
illicit.18 
Thomas here makes a standard stipulation concerning justified force; namely, more than 
necessary force undermines permissibility.19 Aquinas proposes (and does so clearly) that the 
disproportion vitiates the otherwise good act (otherwise good in part due to the – still – good 
intent), rendering it illicit. Here, by contrast, is Knauer: 
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[i]n sinning a man seeks a real good, but his act in its total 
existential entirety is not proportioned to this good. Then 
the evil arising thereby, whether it is desired or not, belongs 
objectively to the act and is objectively what is 
“intended.”20 
Knauer misunderstands Thomas to hold that if an act lacks the noted proportion, the agent 
thereby intends the bad at issue. Aquinas does not assert, however, that lack of proportion alters 
the good intention. (Indeed, his focus upon object, end, and circumstances in act-evaluation 
prevents exactly such a reductive account. For the lack of proportion (a circumstance) obtains 
independently of the object and end – upon which intent bears). Rather, and to reiterate, Thomas 
notes a perennial commonplace: disproportionate force renders an otherwise permissible act 
impermissible. In effect, Knauer employs a gross Consequentialist approach to eliminate the role 
of intent; he reduces intent to a function of the balance of good over evil. Anscombe 
understandably rejects such a confused account.21 The, “package Doctrine of Double Effect,” or 
Proportionalism amounts to a consequentialist corruption of the correct moral insight found in 
the I/F distinction. Let us turn now to her, “principle of side effects.” 
II. Anscombe’s Principle of Side Effects. 
 In 1982 on the occasion of her receipt of the Aquinas Medal, Anscombe delivered a paper 
entitled, “Medalist’s Address: Action, Intention and ‘Double Effect’”. In it she proposes her, 
“principle of side-effects”: 
I will call it the ‘principle of side-effects’ that the 
prohibition on murder does not cover all bringing about of 
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deaths which are not intended. Not that such deaths aren’t 
often murder. But the quite clear and certain prohibition on 
intentional killing (with the relevant ‘public’ exceptions) 
does not catch you when your action brings about an 
unintended death. (original emphasis)22 
By “murder”, Anscombe means wrongful killing of the innocent, intentional or otherwise: 
there can be borderline cases arising because murder is not 
committed only where there was an intention to kill. The 
arsonist who burns down a house, not caring that there are 
people there, is as much a murderer if they are burned to 
death by his action, as if he had aimed to kill them. This 
action falls squarely within a penumbra surrounding the 
hard-core part of the concept of murder, which contains 
only intentional killing. The penumbra is fuzzy at the outer 
edges – that is, there are borderline cases. But that fact does 
not mean that an absolute prohibition on murder makes no 
sense.23 
Given the reasonableness of an absolute prohibition against murder, the principle of side-effects 
(or something like it) becomes necessary.24 For, otherwise, as Anscombe illustrates the point: 
you can’t build roads and fast vehicles, you can’t have 
various sports and races, you can’t have ships voyaging 
over the seas, without its being predictable that there will 
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be deaths resulting.25 
So, the principle of side effects defines the set of cases that are not necessarily wrong (as 
intentional killings of the innocent). As she notes, “the principle is modest: it says ‘where you 
must not aim at someone’s death, causing it does not necessarily incur guilt’” (original 
emphasis).26 
Anscombe goes on, saying: 
[t]he principle is unexceptionably illustrated by some 
examples of dangerous surgery, by some closings of doors 
to contain fire or water; or by having ships and airlines. In 
these we are helped by thinking of the deaths as either 
remote or uncertain.27 
Anscombe notes that the principle of side effects, “does not say when you may foreseeably cause 
death” (original emphasis).28 However, the above-mentioned unexceptionable cases with 
reference to the remoteness or uncertainty of the outcomes suggest that we have two features to 
focus upon: the remoteness of the foreseen bad outcome or its uncertainty. 
 Take remoteness first. Consider flood doors in a submarine. When closed to prevent the 
deaths of the entire crew (and the submarine’s sinking), the deaths of the submariners in the 
flooded section, although certain, are remote. For one closes the doors and at some remove 
(causally and temporally, subsequent to the compartment’s filling with water), the submariners 
die. 
 Now, take uncertainty. To consider examples Anscombe herself proposes, we 
legitimately fly airplanes, launch ships, build roads, and manufacture cars although we know that 
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doing so will result in the deaths of innocents. For while those deaths are foreseen with statistical 
certitude they are not individually foreseen as certain. For example, we know with (statistical) 
certitude that given a certain number of flights, a certain number of deaths due to crashes will 
occur. This certitude does not make flying planes a violation of the absolute prohibition against 
murder. Were we, however, to fly a specific plane knowing with certitude that its flying would 
result in the deaths of innocents, we would apparently be culpable of murder, regardless of our 
not intending that result. 
 Again, we have Anscombe’s proposal that: 
[h]aving accepted the principle of side effects, we need 
some further principle or principles on which to judge the 
unintended causing of death. There is one which both 
seems obvious and covers a good many cases. The intrinsic 
certainty of the death of the victim, or its great likelihood 
from the nature of the case, would exclude moving the rock 
[in the famous cave-explorer case]. Here is a reasonable 
principle. Surgery would be thought murderous, even 
though it was not done to kill, but, say, to get an organ for 
someone else, if the death of the subject were expected as a 
near consequence, pretty certain from the nature of the 
operation.29 
From the above, it appears as if the principle of side effects complemented by the remoteness 
(not a, “near consequence,”) or lack of certainty of the foreseen outcome secures permissibility 
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of the contemplated action. This appears to me to be the import of Professor Anscombe’s 
principle of side effects. 
 I want to propose, apparently in contrast to her account (I am loathe to admit), that while 
proximity (if I may use that as opposed to remoteness) and certitude of an innocent’s death as a 
foreseen but not intended consequence of what one does often constitute murder (as, for example 
in the arsonist and organ-transplantation cases Professor Anscombe mentions), they need not (as 
she herself elsewhere acknowledges in a case of terminal sedation which I take to instance both 
proximate and certain death).30 
 In her rejection of the, “package Doctrine of Double Effect,” (or, Proportionalism), 
Anscombe says: 
[t]he Principle of Side Effects says no more than that 
moving the rock is not excluded by the prohibition on 
intentional killing. For, as I have explained it, that principle 
is not a package deal and it does not say what 
circumstances or needs excuse unintended causing of death. 
Some principle or principles are needed, and if we adopt 
that one principle, of the balance of good over evil in the 
expected upshot, then it becomes obscure why we could not 
do this where the causation of death was perfectly 
intentional. And that seems to be the principal ground on 
which some thinkers throw the whole package out of the 
window, and talk about a deliberate killing, for example, as 
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so far a ‘pre-moral’ evil’. ... the nerve of the rejection of 
former doctrine is here.(original emphasis)31 
In order to determine permissibility in a case where one foresees death as a concomitant of one’s 
act, with what does one complement the I/F distinction? Anscombe suggests that complementing 
the I/F distinction with quasi-consequentialist considerations (the balance of good over evil) 
makes it difficult to argue that one could not have recourse to the balance of good over evil in a 
case involving an outright intent to kill. Or, as she says, “it becomes obscure why we could not 
do this where the causation of death was perfectly intentional.” 
 In what follows, I hope to clear up this obscurity and show the reasonableness of a 
standard account of double effect in which the I/F distinction functions in conjunction with 
unobjectionable quasi-consequentialist considerations. I will do so in broadly Aristotelian-
Thomistic (and Anscombian) terms. I will begin with a brief presentation of Aquinas’ account of 
double effect, subsequently moving on to focus on the ethical relevance of the I/F distinction. 
III. A (Sound) Account of Double Effect. 
 In the locus classicus of double effect (Summa theologiae, IIaIIae, q. 64, a.7), the great 
Dominican friar considers the (Natural Law) licitness of a private individual’s homicidal act of 
self-defense. He says: 
[n]othing prevents one act from having two effects, of 
which only one is intended, the other being besides the 
intention (praeter intentionem). Now moral acts receive 
their character according to that which is intended, not, 
however, from that which is praeter intentionem, since this 
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is accidental, as is evident from what has been said earlier 
[S.t., IIa-IIae, q. 43, a. 3, c.]. Thus, from the act of self-
defense, two effects may follow: one, the conservation of 
one’s own life; the other, the death of the attacker 
(invadentis). Since what is intended is the conservation of 
one’s own life, such an act is not illicit: it is natural for each 
thing to preserve itself in existence for as long as it is able. 
Nevertheless, some act proceeding from a good intention 
may be rendered illicit if it is not proportioned to the end 
(proportionatus fini). Thus, it would not be licit if someone 
defending his own life were to use more force than 
necessary. But, if he repels force with moderation, his 
defensive act will be licit: for, according to the jurists, “it is 
licit to repel force by force, with the moderation of a 
blameless defense.”32 Nor is it necessary for salvation that a 
man forego an act of moderate force in order to avoid the 
death of another: since one is more responsible to care for 
one’s own life than someone else’s. But, since to kill a man 
is not licit except for the public authority acting for the sake 
of the common good (as is evident from what was 
previously said [S.t., IIa-IIae, q.64, a.3, c.]), it is not licit for 
a man to intend to kill (intendat occidere) in order to 
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defend himself, except for those who have public authority. 
These, intending to kill a man in self-defense, refer this to 
the public good. This is evident in the case of a soldier 
fighting an enemy, and in the case of a minister of the 
judge fighting against thieves. Nevertheless, even these 
would sin if they were moved by private animosity.33 
To avoid initial confusion about St. Thomas’ account, a number of points bear notice. First, as he 
says here, Aquinas considers it legitimate for one having public authority to intend to kill in self-
defense. (Notably, in the aside at the end of the corpus he rejects officers of the polity killing 
with Dirty-Harry-“make-my-day” private animosity.) Thus, in the article, he addresses the case 
of a private individual whose act of self-defense results in the assailant’s death. Second (and an 
allied point), Aquinas considers this case assuming that the relevant polity has not granted a 
private individual the authority to intend to kill in self-defense. He does so while clearly 
indicating that a polity could grant that authority. Indeed, it has authorized soldiers and its 
officers in need of such authority to intend to kill in self-defense. Thus, absent a polity legalizing 
intentional killing in self-defense, the natural law defaults to prohibiting a private individual 
from intending to kill an aggressor in self-defense. A polity, however, may deputize, as it were, 
its citizens to intend to kill in defense of self (and others).34 Third, we must avoid imagining the 
defense Aquinas has in mind anachronistically, involving exclusively offensive and 
determinatively lethal weapons such as pistols. Needless to say, Aquinas does not have such 
weapons in mind. Rather, as the sed contra taken from Exodus 22:2 suggests, Thomas imagines 
an assailant suffering injury that proves fatal, e.g., a physical struggle, perhaps involving a knife, 
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sword or item at hand, not the shooting of an aggressor.35 Fourth and finally, to understand 
Aquinas’ account, we must keep in mind the Dionysian dictum: “the good arises from causal 
integrity; the bad from any single defect.”36 As St. Thomas tells us elsewhere, the good act will 
be wholly good, particularly with respect to what is done (object/deed), why it is done (end), and 
in what circumstances it is done.37 The bad act will fall short in any of these respects. 
 With the above caveats in mind, let us consider St. Thomas’ inaugural double-effect 
analysis. Most prominently, he employs the intentionem/praeter intentionem (intended/beside the 
intention) distinction. We customarily speak of what is praeter intentionem as foreseen but not 
intended or, simply, foreseen. While not Aquinas’ terminology, I think it accurately conveys 
what he has in mind, although the contrast might be more accurately spoken of as the 
intended/voluntary distinction. As Aquinas’ discussion of the case indicates, what is praeter 
intentionem is voluntary (knowingly willingly brought about), yet not intended. As voluntary, the 
agent is fully responsible for what he causes praeter intentionem. Were the praeter intentionem 
not voluntary, Aquinas would have nothing further to say concerning the (praeter intentionem) 
death of the assailant. What is beside the intention has relevance in act-evaluation as a 
circumstance of the act (circum-stare, something standing around); however, it does not define 
the act as intent does. 
 Intent, like an act, is complex, bearing on means and end. We will the end, choose the 
means, and intend the end-through-means. To employ Thomas’ example, we will health, choose 
medicine, and intend health-through-medicine.38 Our act is one of taking aspirin to be healthy. 
As Anscombe notes, it answers “how?” (taking aspirin) and “why?” (for health) questions.39 The 
means answers “how?”; the end answers “why?”. As intent includes both, it plays a crucial role 
in act-analysis. Of course, as Anscombe memorably puts it, “an object is not what what is aimed 
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at is; the description under which it is aimed at is that under which it is called the object” 
(original emphasis).40 Moreover, as Miss Anscombe says, “to call an action intentional is to say 
it is intentional under some description.”41 This description is the verbal form the agent’s intent 
takes. Thus, “swallowing a little white thing,” although a true description, does not get at the 
intentional act, “taking an aspirin for my health.” 
 With these distinctions in mind, consider Thomas’ specific case. The intent is, “defend-
oneself to preserve one’s life.” In this intent, we find: first, the answer to “how?”, the means or 
object of self-defense (tutelae); and, second, the answer to “why?”, the end of self-preservation 
(conservatio propriae vitae). If we are correct in our act-analysis, we have the object and the end 
to be evaluated. What of this end? Is it ethically legitimate? As St. Thomas notes, it is natural for 
each thing to keep itself in existence. Indeed, we here recall Aquinas’ ordering of the precepts of 
the natural law’s first principle: “do and pursue good; avoid evil.”42 To the first order of precepts 
belong those bearing on the, “preservation of human life and preventing of the contrary.”43 Thus, 
the intended end, self-preservation, is eminently licit. 
 What of the means, the object, self-defense (absent intent to kill)? As we have seen, the 
deed of self-defense could lack proportion towards the licit end of self-preservation were one to 
use more force than necessary. The use of more than necessary force would be one of those 
defects that could render an otherwise licit object illicit. Here we encounter the good friar’s 
common sense. As St. Thomas notes at the outset of q.64, homicide is, “the greatest harm to 
one’s neighbor.”44 Indeed, because it is the greatest of harms, it belongs – as Thomas notes, 
again in the proemium to q. 64 – amongst those that are inflicted on our neighbor against his 
will. Accordingly, just as inflicting harm at all when none is necessary would render the object of 
self-defense illicit (say one could easily cross the street), so, too, does using more than necessary 
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force. Moderate self-defense, however, does not suffer this defect of disproportion. Thus far, we 
have assessed the act of moderate self-defense undertaken for self-preservation resulting in the 
assailant’s (not intended) death as licit. Yet, if the assailant’s death has the character of malum, 
or something to be avoided (evitandum occisionem alterius) as it no doubt does, why not 
absolutely avoid it? 
 St. Thomas answers this reasonable question by noting that a man is more bound to care 
for his own life than that of another.45 That is, one has a greater responsibility to preserve one’s 
own life than one has to preserve another’s. Accordingly, it is licit for a private individual 
moderately to defend his own life absent the intent to kill. How may we state the criteria 
discernible in Aquinas’ account more generally? 
 Notably, St. Thomas does not set forth a general account to deal with double-effect 
cases.46 I propose the following as a more general account of double effect. An otherwise licit act 
effecting good and bad is licit if the agent: 
1) intends the good while not intending the bad (either as 
an end or as a means), 
2) effects the least bad practically necessary 
(proportionatus fini), and 
3) has a greater or comparable obligation to pursue the 
good than to avoid effecting the bad at issue.47 
The above conditions are each necessary and together suffice to render licit an act of double 
effect. 
 Here, we find our final quarry. Anscombe as well as opponents of an intention-sensitive 
ethic (e.g., her nemesis, the Consequentialist) raise a difficulty concerning the fourth condition: 
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if we adopt that one principle, of the balance of good over 
evil in the expected upshot, then it becomes obscure why 
we could not do this where the causation of death was 
perfectly intentional.48 
Of course, there are diverse (Consequentialist, or Deontological, or Natural Law) construals of, 
“greater or comparable obligation.” Not all concur with the more straightforwardly 
Consequentialist, “balance of good over evil,” way of putting the point. I will put this difference 
to the side. For it is not the current source of disagreement. Rather, the difficulty Anscombe 
shares with the Consequentialist goes to the heart of the I/F distinction and to DER, also. How 
can intent have moral relevance such that were the agent to intend the bad, the act would be ruled 
out of bounds, while absent such intent, the bad still counts against the act but not so as to render 
it illicit? This is the obscurity I hope to illuminate. I will do so by considering the moral import 
of the difference between the intended and the foreseen but not intended (or what I will call the 
simply voluntary).49 
IV. The Intended/Simply Voluntary Distinction. 
 Paraphrasing Aristotle, those who evaluate agents and acts as virtuous or vicious must 
first determine what makes an agent an agent and an act an act.50 One errs who considers this 
need unique to a Eudaimonistic account. E.g., the Consequentialist also must first articulate what 
makes action action. Indeed, every investigation faces this requirement of an account concerning 
what is being looked into, its subject matter. Biologists demarcate the living from the non-living; 
zoologists, the animal from the non-animal; ornithologists, birds from other animals; and so on. 
Ethics is no different. It, too, must give an account of its subject matter. Accordingly, we must 
first delimit our field of study: the voluntary. 
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 Here, it would be difficult to improve on Aristotle’s account. Aristotle (logically) 
contrasts the voluntary (X6@LF\@4H) from the not voluntary. Amongst the not voluntary (along 
with necessary occurrences such as solstices, natural occurrences such as growing old and dying, 
and chance occurrences such as finding a treasure) belongs the counter-voluntary (•6@bF4@H) 
such as the wind blowing sailors off course. To the countervoluntary belong acts (subsequently 
regretted) done either by ignorance (*4’ –(<@4"<) of the particulars of which an action consists 
or by force ($\‘). Aristotle notes (non-controversially) that ignorance does not always constitute 
the counter-voluntary. In determining which types of ignorance cause actions to be 
countervoluntary by ignorance (the preposition indicates the ignorance as causal), Aristotle 
excludes ignorance of which the agent is culpable as that of the drunk who acts in the ignorance 
which she voluntarily caused by her drunkenness. He also excludes ignorance of what is actually 
virtuous or vicious for which ignorance the agent is responsible (as joint cause of her character). 
Excluding what occurs by ignorance or by force (counter-voluntarily), by nature, by necessity, or 
by chance, we have the voluntary. More positively, the voluntary is a knowing-wanting. 
 The voluntary constitutes the subject matter of ethics. As Anscombe (following Aquinas 
following Aristotle) notes, one need add no further characteristic to a human action (other than 
its voluntariness by which it is a human action) in virtue of which it becomes subject to moral 
evaluation.51 Rather, one need merely note its voluntary, knowing-willing character. I.e., that it 
was, indeed, an action. Immediately, it thereby becomes subject to ethical evaluation as either 
integrally good or defectively bad. Correspondingly, one need only establish that a happening 
involving one was not knowingly-willingly brought about by one’s self (“I tripped, was pushed, 
blown by the wind, ...”), and the happening (and oneself) are not subject to ethical appraisal. 
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 This is a remarkable commonplace. Moreover, it is full of import for our purposes. 
Remarkable, because it emphatically points towards our psychological nature. A commonplace; 
for children readily recognize its truth on the playground (“he shoved me into you”) while all 
criminal law abides by it in the venerable, “actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea,” or, simply, 
mens rea.
52
 It is full of import because it points us towards what has the most basic ethical 
relevance; namely, states of knowing-willing mind. E.g., were one without knowledge or will to 
function as a crucial link in a catastrophic causal chain, there would be no subject matter for 
ethical evaluation – no matter how dire the consequences. Conversely, (paraphrasing Kant) an 
unlucky Mother Theresa who through no fault of her own fails to relieve human suffering 
remains good as do her fruitless acts. Before moving on to consider the difference between the 
simply voluntary and the deliberate, chosen, and intended, I want to delimit and offer a few 
examples of what I have in mind when I speak of the simply voluntary. 
 Many of our doings are simply voluntary, things we do knowingly and willingly, yet 
without further epistemic or volitional features concerning them. By the simply voluntary I do 
not mean what we once deliberated about but now do by habit, for example, driving a car. The 
simply voluntary refers to those acts that do not rise to the level of requiring deliberation, just 
being instances of knowing and willing, period. Moreover, by the simply voluntary I do not 
mean an act that cannot be done deliberately. (I doubt that there are such acts.) Perhaps more 
importantly, by the phrase, “concerning them,” (speaking of elements belonging to one act) I 
mean to indicate that the simply voluntary could be an element of a deliberate act, but not in 
virtue of itself being deliberate. E. g., while I deliberately swim in a pool, I simply voluntarily 
displace water from the pool. Notably, many acts of young children (toddlers) are simply 
voluntary, not involving anything more than knowing-willing. Keeping such caveats in mind, 
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one knowingly and willingly eats, drinks, walks, sits, stands, looks at, listens to, talks to, runs 
one’s fingers through one’s hair, and so on. 
 With this (rough) sense of the simply voluntary in place, consider the deliberate, chosen, 
and intended in contrast to the simply voluntary.53 To deliberate about how to achieve one’s end, 
to choose means, and to intend one’s end through those means are each themselves simply 
voluntary. Unlike the simply voluntary that we share broadly with young children and many 
animals (e.g., dogs) adult humans paradigmatically act with choice, deliberation, and intent. 
Accordingly, because such acts originate from a deliberated will (ex voluntate deliberata) 
Aquinas speaks of them as, “properly human.”54 Moreover, these actions concerning our own 
actions (choosing, deliberating, and intending) instance the human tendency to rise above our 
own activity and take it as our object. Just as we know that we know and will that we will, so we 
act (deliberate, choose, and intend) concerning our own actions. We deliberate about how to 
achieve our willed end; upon discovery via deliberation we choose our own deeds as means; and, 
finally, we intend those deeds as means and the effects we produce by them as ends. 
 Now, since knowing-willing demarcates that which is subject to moral evaluation from 
that which is not, further differences within the knowing-willing have further ethical relevance. 
For these further differences ramify, articulate, develop, and unfold within ethics implications of 
the first morally important distinction (between the voluntary and the not voluntary). At this 
point, however, instead of contrasting what has ethical import from what does not, the contrast at 
issue is within the voluntary and, thereby, within the ethical. Thus, only within the voluntary do 
we find properly ethical distinctions between, for example, the licit and illicit, the virtuous and 
the vicious, the just and unjust, the right and wrong, and so on. Following our very first 
distinction (between what is duly associated with the mental states of knowing and willing and, 
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thereby, subject to moral evaluation and what is not, and, thereby, not subject to such 
evaluation), we look initially at diverse mental states in making these properly ethical 
distinctions. 
 To illustrate the moral difference between the intended and the simply voluntary (the I/F 
distinction), allow me to employ a standard pair of contrasted cases: terror and tactical bombing. 
Consider the intended elements found in terror bombing. To terrorize civilians one deliberates 
about and chooses means productive of that end. So, for example, if one determines that fire 
bombs best maim, kill, terrorize, and demoralize civilians, then one chooses them. One tactically 
bombs to destroy a military installation (say an arms-depot), and, thereby, advance the cause of 
victory. The destruction of the depot is the proximate end. So, for example, if one determines 
that fire bombs best destroy it, then one decides upon them as one’s means. Tactical bombing 
instances the deliberately decided upon destruction of a military target concomitantly harming 
(in the double-effect cases) the non-combatant populace. 
 Now, to consider the two acts, stipulate comparable consequences. Thus, both acts do 
terrorize, kill, and maim civilians (comparably) while destroying the depot; both undermine 
support for the war and impede the enemy’s military. Similarly, both advance the cause of 
victory. Why, then, contrast the two acts in question? (Here is our obscurity.) 
 First, not to contrast the two acts is to employ superficial (as Anscombe suggests, 
“shallow,”) inadequate, and childish (in the sense of, “fit for children, not adults,”) criteria for 
act-evaluation. Second, to do so is entirely to ignore the prominent varied viciousness of terror 
bombing in contrast to the absence of the same in tactical bombing. 
 Consider the first charge of superficiality. Amongst our acts we can readily contrast those 
that are simply voluntary (walking) from those that in addition to being voluntary are 
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deliberately decided upon (teaching). Insofar as deliberately decided upon acts more intimately 
and deeply involve thinking-wanting, they more fully instance a human act (knowing-willing). 
They are more fully, more completely, more deeply human acts. For this reason, they belong 
characteristically to adult, mature humans. For such humans robustly plan, order, and design 
their acts fully exercising their capacities as thinkers and willers. While children and animals act 
voluntarily, adult humans in their capacity as adult humans act with deliberate decision, or 
complete, full thinking-willing. Accordingly, when we evaluate deliberately decided upon acts, 
we must do so giving due prominence to those elements of the act which render it deliberately 
decided upon. Otherwise, our assessments lack depth. That is, we would be evaluating an act as 
if it were simply voluntary and not also decided upon deliberately. We would employ a standard 
fit only for a child’s or (and I say this with no disparagement to the child) a dog’s act to an 
adult’s action. (To revise Gertrude Stein’s dictum, “There is more there there.” Thus, one needs 
more in one’s act-evaluation to capture the more that is there.) 
 Moreover, and this brings me to my second claim, we would fail to get at the act as 
vicious (or virtuous). For, as Aristotle says, decision best instances virtue (and vice). Indeed, as 
the very definition of virtue indicates, deliberate decision exemplifies the essence of virtue (and 
vice).55 
 Now, consider our two consequentially comparable acts in terms of virtue and vice. With 
respect to vice, terror bombing is while tactical bombing is not, “murderous, bloody, savage, 
extreme, rude, cruel.”56 Terror bombing targets the innocent, the harmless, those who do not 
threaten (in nocere), the defense-less with a view to inflicting pain, suffering, despair, and terror 
upon them. Thereby, it is unjust, murderous and cowardly. It is unjust: for only the violent merit 
violence; to render violence upon the harmless is not due. It is murderous: purposefully to kill 
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the innocent, as terror bombing does, is to murder. It is cowardly bullying: it targets the 
defenseless who do not threaten. It is savage, extreme, rude, and cruel: for it exemplifies the 
abandonment of that high civility by which the strong and powerful direct lethal fury only upon 
those who might do likewise to them. Indeed, to call it lupine is to insult the wolf who is better to 
wolf than man is to man in countenancing the various vices exemplified in terror bombing. 
 By contrast, tactical bombing targets sources and agents of violence such as an artillery 
installation and those who man it. Thereby, it is just. For violence is due the violent. Nor do the 
deaths of the innocent render it murderous. For it does not aim at the innocent; rather, they are 
(unfortunately) proximate to the (just) violence it does instance. Nor need tactical bombing 
incorporate cowardice. For a military target typically poses a threat to those who seek to destroy 
it. Nor is tactical bombing barbarous, extreme, rude, or cruel. For by it one does not seek out 
civilians as targets and thereby betray a venerable achievement of civilization. Namely, that by 
which the awful violence of war be directed against those who bear arms. Of course, one would 
go too far were one not to note room for criticism of tactical bombing. It may instance 
callousness and indifference to the suffering of others. Certainly, one would err if one were 
positively to recommend it. For while it need not incorporate malice towards the non-
combatants, it is certainly not a benevolent act; indeed, it does nothing but harm to them. 
Nonetheless, as the I/F (or, more precisely, the Intended/Simply Voluntary) distinction indicates, 
terror bombing necessarily exemplifies a variously vicious (barbarous, murderous, unjust, and 
cowardly) deed while tactical bombing need not. 
 In summation, the I/F distinction captures ethically relevant differences between 
consequentially comparable acts. It ramifies (the morally relevant side of) ethic’s founding 
distinction between the voluntary and the not voluntary. The intended aspects of an act bear 
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profoundly on act-evaluation insofar as they index the depth of the voluntary. Ethicists who do 
not acknowledge the import of the I/F distinction inevitably make shallow act-evaluations. 
Moreover, they lack the resources by which to assess an act’s exemplification of virtue or vice. 
 To conclude, recall Anscombe’s exhortation: 
[i]t would be a great improvement if, instead of “morally 
wrong,” one always names a genus such as “untruthful,” 
“unchaste,” “unjust.” We should no longer ask whether 
doing something was “wrong,” passing directly from some 
description of an action to this notion; we should ask 
whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would 
sometimes be clear at once.57 
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propriae vitae, non habet rationem illiciti, cum hoc sit cuilibet naturale 
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pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis pugnante contra latrones. 
Quamvis et isti etiam peccent si privata libidine moveantur. S.t., 
IIaIIae, q.64, a.7, c.. 
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22: 2, “if a thief breaking or digging into a house is found and, being 
wounded, dies, the one who dwelt the blows would not be guilty of his 
blood.” But it is much more licit to defend one’s own life than one’s 
own home. Therefore, also, if someone kills another in order to defend 
his own life, he will not be guilty of wrongful homicide.” “Sed contra 
est quod Exod. XXII dicitur, si effringens fur domum sive suffodiens 
fuerit inventus, et, accepto vulnere, mortuus fuerit, percussor non erit 
 39 
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quam propriam domum. Ergo etiam si aliquis occidat aliquem pro 
defensione vitae suae, non erit reus homicidii.” (The relevant houses 
were made of earth; thus, breaking in often involved digging into the 
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goes on to say: “[q]uod si orto sole hoc fecerit, homicidium 
perpetravit, et ipse morietur.” “[b]ut if he did this while the sun was 
risen, he perpetrated wrongful killing, and he himself shall die.” The 
relevance of the sun being risen generates debate, understandably. One 
sensible interpretation is that the householder at night who encounters 
a thief reasonably regards his life (and perhaps those of others in the 
household) as threatened. For he cannot discern as easily at night as he 
can during the day the nature of the threat (theft or grievous bodily 
harm). Moreover, during the day he can more easily secure assistance 
from neighbors. Although this interpretation of the text slightly differs 
from St. Thomas’ suggestion that what we here find justified is 
homicide in defense of one’s house, it vindicates his use of it. For the 
crucial point he makes stands. Namely, the Scriptural authority 
grounds the licitness of a private individual’s act of self-defense that 
results in the (at night-time, presumed) assailant’s death. In fact, the 
text is even more to his point than St. Thomas’ construal of it. For as 
the text itself endorses self-defense (not defense of one’s house) no a 
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fortiori argument (as employed by Aquinas) is necessary. 
36.S.t., IaIIae, q.19, a.6, ad 1, “sicut Dionysius dicit in IV cap. de Div. 
Nom., bonum causatur ex integra causa, malum autem ex singularibus 
defectibus.” 
37.S.t., IaIIae, q.18, a.4, c.. 
38.S.t., IaIIae, q. 12, a. 1, ad 4. 
39.Anscombe, Intention, section 26, 46-7. 
40.Ibid., section 35, 66.  
41.Ibid., section 19, 29. 
42.S.t, IIaIIae, q.94, a.2, c., “Hoc est ergo primum praeceptum legis, 
quod bonum est faciendum et prosequendum, et malum vitandum.”  
43.Ibid., “quaelibet substantia appetit conservationem sui esse 
secundum suam naturam. Et secundum hanc inclinationem, pertinet ad 
legem naturalem ea per quae vita hominis conservatur, et contrarium 
impeditur.” 
44.S.t., IIaIIae, q. 64, proemium, “homicidio, per quod maxime 
nocetur proximo.” 
45.S.t., IIaIIae, q.64, a.7, c.: “plus tenetur homo vitae suae providere 
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quam vitae alienae.” 
46.He does, however, earlier present something very much like his 
account of licit private self-defense in his consideration of passive 
scandal. S.t., IIaIIae, q.43; see, for example, article 7 where he holds 
that since, “a man ought to love his own salvation more than 
another’s,” (interestingly parallel to his S.t., IIaIIae, q.64, a.7, c., “one 
is bound to take more care of one’s own life than that of another,”) he 
ought not forego spiritual goods necessary for his salvation to avoid 
(praeter intentionem) scandal. 
47.“Or comparable” departs from St. Thomas’, “is more bound (plus 
tenetur).” When the obligation concerning the good at issue is greater 
than the obligation to avoid the evil, it would be obligatory to engage 
in the contemplated act. Although Aquinas does not extend his account 
to such cases, I think it licit to act if the obligations are comparable in 
gravity. Of course, in such cases, acting would not be obligatory. In 
short, a reasonable person might remain ambivalent about what he 
ought to do. For example, a terminally ill patient might correctly judge 
it licit to forego or undergo terminal sedation (the aforementioned 
pain-relieving and death-dealing drug). 
48.Anscombe, “Medalist’s Address,” 24; also found in Human Life, 
224. 
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49.Anscombe describes the foreseen but not intended as voluntary: 
[s]omething is voluntary though not intentional if it is the 
antecedently known concomitant result of one’s intentional 
action, so that one could have prevented it if one would 
have given up the action; but it is not intentional; one 
rejects the question ‘Why?’ in its connection (Intention, 
section 49, 89). 
50.To anticipate an objection that itself merits an entire paper, I differ 
with those critics of the I/F distinction who would draw an almost 
dichotomous distinction between the morally salient aspects we attend 
to in our evaluations of acts and those we rely on in our assessments of 
agents. Certainly, act and agent-assessment differ; the one is not the 
other. This truth, however, does not ground a typical charge against 
DER: that it erroneously takes an ethically important matter in agent-
evaluation (the agent’s intent or lack thereof) as an ethically relevant 
matter in act-evaluation. Many critics of DER typically have recourse 
to this move to accommodate the widely shared intuition (captured by 
DER) that intent morally differs from foresight of comparable bad 
consequences. They propose that intent matters in agent, but not in act-
evaluation. So, for example, such thinkers might hold that the terror 
bomber is a worse agent than the tactical bomber, but an act of terror 
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bombing does not morally differ from a consequentially comparable 
act of tactical bombing. (See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson, 
“Physician-Assisted Suicide: Two Moral Arguments,” Ethics 109 
(1999): 497-518, at 517 and T. M. Scanlon, Moral Dimensions: 
Permissibility, Meaning, Blame (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2008), 20-36). As an attempt to make a place for the ubiquitous 
intuition, however, the move fails. For the intuition concerns both act 
and agent, as one who proposes the I/F distinction would expect. There 
is, of course, much to be said concerning the relation between act-
evaluation (sometimes referred to as first-order morality), agent-
evaluation (sometimes spoken of as second-order morality), and DER. 
For further consideration of the topic, see T. A. Cavanaugh, Double-
Effect Reasoning: Doing Good and Avoiding Evil (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2006), 122-34; see also, T. A. Cavanaugh, “Double-effect 
Reasoning Defended: A Response to Scanlon,” Proceedings of the 
American Catholic Philosophical Association, 86 (2012): 267-79. 
51.See Aristotle at Nicomachean Ethics III.1; Aquinas at S.t. IaIIae, q. 
18, a. 9; and  Anscombe in “Medalist’s Address,” 13-20 (also found in 
Human Life, 209 et passim). 
52.We are told (by Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland in The 
History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, second edition, 2 
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vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952), 2:476) that the 
phrase can be traced back at least to Augustine’s comment on perjury: 
“[r]eam linguam non facit mens rea,” “[p]erjury does not exist absent 
the mental element” (Augustine, Sermones, No. 180, c.2., Migne, 
Patrol. Vol. 38, col. 974). In other words, simply saying something 
under oath that is false does not constitute perjury; one must also 
intend, thereby, to deceive those to whom one speaks. 
53.I am not going to develop the differences between deliberation, 
choice, and intention. Briefly, I note the following. Intent concerns 
end-via-means and issues from deliberation. Choice concerns means 
and also issues from deliberation. Deliberation issues from the willing 
of an end. Given the willed end, deliberation determines the means by 
which one achieves one’s end. One might abandon deliberation and 
thus not choose means and thus not intend end and means. The 
intended (end-through-means) is chosen (in respect of its means) and 
deliberate (in respect of both). 
54.Aquinas, S.t., IaIIae, q.1., a.1, c.. 
55.Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, “virtue is a habit of deciding,” “Z 
•D,J¬ ª>4H BD@"4D,J46Z,” (1106b36).  
56.Shakespeare, Sonnet 129, 3-4. (This paragraph relies on my, 
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“Aristotle’s Voluntary/Deliberate Distinction, Double Effect and 
Ethical Relevance,” International Philosophical Quarterly, 
forthcoming. 
57.Anscombe, “Modern Moral Philosophy,” 8-9; also available in 
Human Life, 180. 
